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Mezzanotte: Comments on Argentina's New Leniency Program

COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S NEW LENIENCY PROGRAM
FilixE. Mezzanotte
I.

INTRODUCTION

Argentina has passed a new competition law, Ley de Defensa de la Competencia
("LDC") that creates, for the first time, a leniency program ("ALP").' The goal of this article
is to outline the ALP's key characteristics and analyze them critically. As a basis for this
analysis, this article will look to the leniency policies in the United States ("US") and the
European Union ("EU"). Additionally, the economic research investigating the effectiveness
of leniency programs will also be utilized. From the vantage point of cartel enforcement
policy, the decision to create the ALP is praiseworthy. When leniency programs are designed
and implemented correctly, they can be a powerful tool for competition authorities ("CA") to
defeat hard-core cartels, the most malign form of anticompetitive conduct.
In a cartel, competition forces are missing because cartel members enter into
agreements not to compete with each other. They may agree to fix prices, restrict supply,
3
allocate markets, or rig bids, among other forms of collusion. These cartel activities are
harmful to the welfare of consumers and society. Cartelized markets are characterized by
higher prices, lower quality of products or services, less innovation and diminished consumer
choice. 4 In the US, for example, the activity of hard-core cartels for all time periods (since
recording started) have imposed on US consumers price overcharges of 23.3% on average.
In Asia, price overcharges due to cartel activities are estimated to have reached up to US$ 500
billion through 1990 to 2007. 6 Although competition laws bar cartels, enforcing this
prohibition has proved difficult. Cartels are outlaws; they operate secretly and conceal

.Assistant Professor, School of Accounting and Finance, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Address: M610,
Li Ka Shing Tower, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Email:
affemezz@polyu.edu.hk. Claims and errors are the sole responsibility of this author.
' Ley de Defensa de la Competencia (Ley 27.442) [hereinafter LDC]. Passed by the Argentine National
Congress on 9 May 2018 and published in the Official Bulletin on 14 May 2018; Decreto Reglamentario
480/2018 of 23 March 2018. This complements the LDC [hereinafter LDCR]. Argentina's leniency program
("ALP") has been regulated in Chapter VIII of the LDC.
2 RIcHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW Ch. 1,3,13-16) (Oxford Univ. Press 9" ed. 2018);
KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAw: EcONOMIc THEORY AND COMMON LAW EvOLUTION 68-69 (Cambridge

Univ. Press 2003); Kai-Uwe Ktthn, Fighting Collusion by Regulating Communication between Firms, 16
EcoN. POL'Y, no. 32, 169, 169-204 (Apr. 2001); Stephen Martin, Competition Policy, Collusion and Tacit
Collusion, 24 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 1299, 1299-332 (2006).
RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAw, Ch. 1,3,13-16 (Oxford Univ. Press 9 h ed. 2018).
4 Id.

See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Cartels as RationalBusiness Strategy: Crime Pays, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 427, 456-57 (2012) (Several studies have quantified diverse costs of collusion including "umbrella
effects" by which firms outside the cartel end up charging the same prices as the cartel). See also John M.
Connor & Robert H. Lande, The Size of Cartel Overcharges:Implicationsfor US and EU FiningPolicies, 51
ANTITRUST BULL. (WINTER) 983, 983-87 (2006).
6 J. M. Connor, Global Antitrust ProsecutionsofInternationalCartel:Focus on Asia, 31 WORLD COMPLETION

575-605, 595 (2002).

163

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

1

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 5
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

,

evidence that may incriminate them.' Uncovering evidence of cartel conduct has been a
major challenge to CAs. Leniency programs have proven instrumental because they are
designed precisely to address the problem of detecting and convicting cartels.
In leniency programs, one or more cartel participant is given the opportunity to
avoid sanctions if they self-report the anticompetitive conduct. 9 More specifically, a cartel
member is offered total, or partial immunity from sanctions in exchange for the member's
confession of misconduct and full cooperation with the CA's investigation.10 In the arsenal
available to CAs, this strategy has thus far proved to be a formidable weapon to enforce the
cartel prohibition." First implemented by the US Department of Justice ("US DOJ") in 1978,
and significantly reformed later in 1993, the US Corporate Leniency Program ("US CLP")
has become the most prominent tool guiding cartel law enforcement in the United States.12
The US DOJ has stressed that, '[t]he Antitrust Division's Leniency Program is its most
important investigative tool for detecting cartel activity.'13
Over the years, leniency programs have been widely adopted by other countries
around the world. As Hammond states, '[t]he single most significant development in cartel
enforcement is the proliferation of effective leniency programs."1 4 This expansion of leniency
programs globally has been perceived by the business community as a sign of increasingly
effective antitrust law enforcement. 15 The European Union implemented its own leniency
policy, 16 as did EU member states, Canada, Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
others. 17 In Latin America, several countries have followed suit and adopted a leniency

See MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, at 137-230

(Cambridge

Univ. Press

2004).
8Id.
Wouter P.J. Wils, Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice, 30 WORLD COMPETITION: LAW

& ECON. REv. 1 (2013).
10 Id.

1

Wouter P.J. Wils, The Use of Leniency in the EU CartelEnforcement: An Assessment after Twenty Years, 39

WORLD COMPETITION: LAW & ECONOMICS REv. 3 (2016)

See generally Caron Beaton-Wells and Christopher Tran (eds.), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary
Age: Leniency Religion (2015, Hart Publishing).
12

Coporate

Leniency

Program,

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE

CORPORATE

LENIENCY

PROGRAM,

https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/81028 1/download (last visited May 16, 2017).
13 Id.
14 Scott D. Hammond, Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement, Measuring the Value of Second-In
Cooperationin CorporatePlea Negotiations, JUSTICE NEWS (Mar. 29, 2006).
15 Joan Ram6n Borrell et al., Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs, XARA DE REFERENCIA EN

ECONOMIA APLICADA (2012), http://www.ub.edu/ubeconomics/wp-content/uploads/201 2/02/XREAP201201.pdf.
'6 Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, OFFICIAL J. OF EUR.

UNION ¶ 13, (Aug. 12, 2006)
https://eur lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:298:0017:0022:EN:PDF.
See also, M
Hellwig & K Hilschelrath, Cartel Cases and the Cartel Enforcement Process in the European Union 20012015: A Quantitative Assessment, 426-427 (ZEW DISCUSSION PAPER 16-063, WORKING PAPER 2016),
https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/146903 (concluding that leniency policy is an important and effective
tool of contemporary EU cartel policy).
1
Members,
INT'L
COMPETITION
NETWORK
MEMBERS
HTTPS://WWW.INTERNATIONALCOMPETITIONNETWORK.ORG/MEMBERS/ (LAST VISITED MAY 16,2019).
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establishing its own leniency
In the next section of this article, the characteristics of the ALP will be described
including the application process for leniency, the qualification criteria, and the scope of
immunity and penalty reductions. In section III, selected features of the ALP will be analyzed
critically including the first confessor rule and the extent of the penalty reductions offered to
runner-up applicants. Since leniency programs should not only detect, but also deter cartel
activity, section IV of this article will look at the ALP's deterrent properties. Deterrence
consists of precluding agents from breaking the law-more specifically in this paper,
precluding agents from forming new cartels or achieving more stable cartels-by the fear of
9
sufficiently heavy and prompt sanctions. Deterrent effects influence the business conduct of
20
agents ex-ante as they anticipate the costs of engaging in unlawful conduct.
This article concludes that the ALP has, in general terms, adhered to international
practices on leniency policy. The ALP offers to the first confessor (the first qualified
applicant) ample immunity from sanctions, including exemptions from statutory civil fines,
imprisonment and other criminal sanctions; such immunity is granted automatically. The first
confessor may also receive immunity from civil antitrust lawsuits. To qualify as the first
confessor, the applicant must satisfy less stringent requirements than those sought by the EU
leniency program, and, especially, by the US CLP.
Perhaps the most important point made by this article draws from the ALP's
treatment of runner-up applicants (second confessor, third confessor, and so on). While
economic research is not incompatible with the first confessor being conferred a highly
attractive immunity package, the same research also indicates that runner-up applicants
receive only a minor, or no reduction in sanctions at all. Treating runner-up applicants too
generously would reduce expected sanctions, thereby diminishing critically needed deterrent
effects. The risk is that an aggressive leniency strategy, originally meant to achieve increased
cartel detection and conviction, may well end up encouraging a more rapid formation of new
cartels or causing ongoing cartels to become more stable. Hence, a leniency policy that
reduces sanctions substantially for the benefit of runner-up applicants may ultimately prove
counterproductive from a social perspective. This is a policy that the ALP has embraced.
On this basis, this article recommends that the chief enforcer of the LDC, the
Competition Tribunal, resolve leniency applications submitted by runner-up applicants
cautiously when reducing sanctions. In addition, economic research indicates that enforcers
should undertake not only leniency but also non-leniency investigations. Non-leniency
investigations are important because leniency programs are less effective in breaking up the
most successful cartels. Non-leniency investigations are also capable of instilling the fear of
detection and punishment, which is a crucial precondition for deterrence.
This article adds to the general discussion of comparative leniency policies, and
more specifically, to our current understanding of the ALP.

1 Id.
19 P Buccirossi et al., Measuring the Deterrence Properties of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy
Indexes, 7 J. of Competition L. & Econ. 7(1) 165, 168 (2011).
20 Id.
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IT.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LENIENCY PROGRAM
A.

Institutional Setting and Leniency Applications

Article 1 of the LDC states the standard antitrust prohibitions, namely the
prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, unilateral conducts (abuse of a market dominant
position), and concentrations that restrict competition.2 A government agency called the
National Competition Authority ("NCA") will be in charge of enforcing these prohibitions. 22
The NCA has been designed to function and make decisions independently. 23 The NCA will
be composed of a Competition Tribunal ("Tribunal") and two Secretariats. 24 One Secretariat
will conduct investigations on antitrust violations, while the other will perform the control of
25
2
mergers. The Tribunal will be the chief enforcer of the LDC.26 It will manage and resolve
the competition cases, impose sanctions on violators, and issue remedy orders. The Tribunal
will also administer the ALP, and, to this purpose, hear and decide on applications for
leniency.27
The specific legal rules governing the ALP are contained in Chapter VIII of the
LDC. 2 8 Applications for leniency will only be accepted by the Tribunal when the applicant
denounces hard-core cartel activities. 29 Such activities have been listed in Article 2 of the
LDC and involve agreements between competitors that fix prices, restrict supply, allocate
markets or rig bids.3 0 According to the LDC, these agreements constitute an "absolute
restriction" of competition and are presumed to be anti-competitive. 3 They are null and void,
yielding no legal effects.32 Aside from the conducts listed in Article 2 of the LDC, the ALP
will apply to no other violation of the LDC.
Leniency applications will be lodged before the Tribunal any time prior to the
notification under Article 41 LDC. 34 This is a notification made by the Tribunal in the course
of an investigation whereby the Tribunal informs the alleged violators that a competition case
has been opened against them and gives details of the alleged violation. 35 Applications that
are submitted after such notification has been served are ineligible and will be rejected by the

21

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.).

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 18, 19.
Id.
24 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442)
(Arg.) art. 18.
25 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 30, 31.
26 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442)
(Arg.) art. 18, 28.
27 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442)
(Arg.) art. 28(a), 60.
28 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442)
(Arg.) art. 60, 61.
29 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442)
(Arg.) art. 60.
30 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.)
art. 1, 2.
31 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442)
(Arg.) art. 2.
32 Id.
33 Id.; Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 9 (illustrating an inconsistency with current practices in
2

23

the United States and Europe where leniency policy has been utilized to combat no more than hard-core
cartels).
34 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60.
3S

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art 60, 41 (describing that the notified person or entity will then be

entitled to prepare a defense against those allegations).
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Tribunal.36 In order to determine and manage the priority order of leniency applications, the
Tribunal will create a National Registry. 3 This Registry will operate pursuant to the
38
prescriptions set down in the LDC, LDCR and any other rules laid down by the Tribunal.
The applicant for leniency can be a legal person (e.g., a company), or a physical
person (e.g., a director of the company). Article 60 of the LDC permits leniency applications
submitted by, "[a]ny physical or legal person that has or is engaged in conduct that
contravenes Article 2 of this law...."39 There seems to be no restrictions for an applicant to
be eligible for leniency even if, at the time of submitting the application, the applicant was no
longer a member of the reported cartel. Moreover, it does not matter whether the cartel being
reported is still active at the time of the application, or instead, has already ceased to exist.
40
However, a joint application by two or more cartel participants is not permitted.
The application must be submitted on an individual basis. The exception to this rule is when
an individual who is working for the company decides to apply for leniency by adding his/her
4
name to the employer's application. ' This is a scenario where the company applies for
leniency (through a corporate application) in an attempt to gain leniency not just for the
company, but for its employees as well. However, those natural persons included in the
corporate application may benefit from leniency only if each individual meets the
qualification criteria required for the granting of immunity, or penalty reductions, under
Article 60 of the LDC.4 2
Importantly, the LDC has included provisions that preserve the confidentiality of the
Unless the applicant explicitly
information contained in the application for leniency.
authorises otherwise," the Tribunal may not disclose the identity of the applicant or the
evidence and other information submitted by the applicant to the Tribunal; the information
must be kept confidential. 45 This confidentiality requirement also applies to materials
46
requested to the Tribunal by other courts. For example, court orders issued in civil suits for
damages due to the cartel activities. If the Tribunal rejects an application for leniency, the
47
confidentiality rule still applies. The contents of the rejected application is inadmissible as
48
evidence in court and may not be used by the NCA in its investigations.

36 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60.

3 LDCR, Decreto Reglamentario (Law No. 480/2018) (Arg.) art. 60(11) (RegistroNacional de Marcadores).
38 Id.

3 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60.
4 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 61.
41 Id.
42 Id. (the qualification criteria for the granting of immunity from, or reduction in, sanctions will be outlined in
the next subsection of this article).
43 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(d); LDCR, supra note 37, at art. 6011(IV).
" Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(d).

45 Id.
46 Id.
47

d.

48 Id.
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Benefits from Leniency: Qualification Requirements

The ALP offers two types of benefits: (1) the immunity from sanctions or (2) a
reduction in sanctions. 49 To qualify for immunity, the applicant must satisfy each and all the
seven conditions listed below:
(1)

the applicant is the first-in-time provider of relevant information or evidence to
the Tribunal;o

(2) the Tribunal has no information in relation to the antitrust violation; or if an
investigation into the applicant's cartel is underway, the Tribunal has
insufficient evidence of the antitrust violation at the time of the application;"
(3) the applicant must adduce information or evidence that, in the view of the
Tribunal, is admissible, credible and adequate to determine the existence of the
antitrust violation confessed;5 2
(4) the applicant must cease and desist from the unlawful conduct (unless the
Tribunal decided differently in order to protect the investigation);5
(5) the applicant must provide full, continuous and diligent cooperation, starting
from the time of the submission of the application until the end of the
proceedings; 54
(6) the applicant must not hide, destroy or falsify evidence of the anticompetitive
conduct prior to or following the submission of the application for leniency;ss
and,
(7)

4
5o
5
52

the applicant has not divulged or made public his intention to apply for
leniency, except for the case in which the applicant had divulged information to
other competition authorities.s6

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a), 60(b).
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a) 1.
Id.
id.

s3 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a)(2).
5 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a)(3).
5
56

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a)(4).
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a)(5).
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The rules stated in the LDCR add that the applicant will have to explicitly recognize
not only the applicant's participation in one or more of the conducts listed in Article 2 of the
LDC, but also the applicant's duty to cooperate with the Tribunal throughout the leniency
proceedings." The extent of such duty to cooperate will ultimately be decided by the
Tribunal and a breach of this scope constitutes sufficient cause for the Tribunal to reject the
application for leniency.
When requirements 1 through 3 are not fully met, (e.g., the company is a second-intime applicant) the application for immunity will fail. Nevertheless, it is within the Tribunal's
discretion to allow an applicant a reduction in sanctions. The Tribunal may afford the
applicant sanction reductions if the applicant provides new evidence that has not already been
produced by the Tribunal in addition to satisfying the other requirements listed in Article
60(a) of the LDC.
C.

Sanctions Against Participants in Hard-Core Cartels

In order to understand the scope of the immunity and penalty reductions offered by
the ALP, a brief overview of the powers given to the Tribunal to impose sanctions on hardcore cartels and on other anticompetitive conduct is necessary.
The Tribunal may impose statutory civil fines, which may take the form of a fine
imposed on a physical person, or imposed on a legal entity, such as a corporation." Article
55(b) of the LDC sets out two formulas to calculate the total fine amount.61 In the first
formula, the fine may equal up to 30% of the violator's yearly turnover, multiplied by the
number of years of anti-competitive conduct. This amount cannot surpass thirty percent of
the yearly, national and consolidated turnover of the violator. In the second formula, the fine
may equal double the economic benefit obtained by the violator from the unlawful conduct.
The Tribunal will calculate both of the formulas, whichever is the higher amount is the fine
that will be used. But if, for some reason, neither of the formulas can be calculated, the LDC
62
sets a fine cap of 200 million Unidades Mdviles.
In order to determine the fine amount to be imposed, the Tribunal will consider
several factors: the gravity and duration of the violation, the harm caused, gross illegal profit,
the deterrent effects, the value of the assets involved, the violator's market share and size of
the affected market, the violator's intent, and the degree of cooperation by the violator with
63
the Tribunal and/or the Secretariat in the antitrust investigation.
In addition to the statutory civil fine, the Tribunal may also issue disqualification
orders affecting a violator for a period of up to ten years. 6 The cartel's victims are entitled to
obtain redress from any harm they were caused by filing a stand-alone, or a follow-on, lawsuit

s7 LDCR, supra note 37 at art. 60
58

(UI).

Id.

art. 60(b)1.
art. 55.
art. 55(b).
art. 55(b), 85 (the fine was originally capped at 200 million Unidades
Mviles [I UnidadMdvil = 20 AR$]; this cap will be adjusted yearly following the consumer price index PC).
63 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 56.
6 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 58.
Antitrust Law (Law No.
6 Antitrust Law (Law No.
61 Antitrust Law (Law No.
62 Antitrust Law (Law No.
59

27442)
27442)
27442)
27442)

(Arg.)
(Arg.)
(Arg.)
(Arg.)
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in civil court.65 The participation in hard-core cartel activities can also give rise to criminal
liability which could result in imprisonment. However, criminal liability is governed under
the Argentine Penal Code, therefore, criminal liability may only be determined by
proceedings in a Criminal Court, but not before the Tribunal. 6
Importantly, Article 55 of the LDC starts with the statement, '[t]he human or legal
persons who do not comply with the provisions of this law will be subject to the following
sanctions....' 6 7 This rule empowers the Tribunal to impose not only corporate fines against
cartel participants, but also fines against the natural persons who engaged, or participated, in
the prohibited conduct. 68 It has been recommended that the Tribunal use this statutory power
to impose fines on physical persons, like corporate directors, especially in hard-core cartel
cases.69
It is worth noting that physical persons can be subject to other types of sanctions in
addition to fines, such as, disqualification orders, 7 0 damages 7n and criminal sanctions.72
Criminal sanctions against a physical person can result in imprisonment of up to two years for
violating Article 300 of the Argentina Penal Code, ' and/or under Article 309 of the
Argentine Penal Code up to four years of imprisonment, a fine, and up to five years of
disqualification for the violation.74
A physical person can also be found to be jointly liability for the corporate fine
imposed under the first part of Article 58 of the LDC. 7s In a joint liability situation the
Tribunal imposes a corporate fine and the liability for the payment of such a fine turns out to
be jointly held by the cartel participant and its representatives, who are generally physical
76
persons. More specifically, a legal entity's representatives will be jointly liable to pay for
the corporate fine if their conduct has contributed, assisted, or permitted the antitrust
violation, be it by action, or culpable omission of duties. A legal entity's representative could
include one, or all, of the following: directors, managers, controllers, and legal
representatives.7 7
Although the sanctions imposed on physical persons pursuant to Article 58 of the
LDC's joint liability fine appear to address a different scenario than the sanctions on physical
persons imposed pursuant to Article 55(b) of the LDC, this distinction does not emerge with
61

66
67
68

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) arts. 62-65.
C6digo Penal (Criminal Code Act No. 11.179, 1984) (Arg.) arts. 300 and 309.
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 55; LDCR, supra note 37 at art. 56.
See Argentina - Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy, §§ 2.1.1, 6.3, 13 [hereinafter OECD
2006

Report], OECD (2006) www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Argentina-CompetitionLawPolicy.pdf.
The same
interpretation was made in the OECD Peer Review Study of competition law and policy in Argentina based on
Competition Act (No. 25.156) (Arg.) art. 46 of 1999. "Finally, the law permits the imposition of fines on

natural persons for conduct violations subject to the same maximum [as per fines on legal entities], but no such
fines were imposed in the recent cases."
69 Id.
70
71
72

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 58.
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) arts. 62-65.
C6digo Penal, supranote 68, at arts. 300 and 309.

74

Id. at art. 300.
Id. at art. 309.

7s

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 58.

76

Id.

73

77Id.
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78
sufficient clarity from the text of the LDC. Article 55(b) of the LDC entails the imposition
of a monetary sanction on a physical person who engaged in anticompetitive conduct,
whereas Article 58 of the LDC draws from a jointly liable corporate fine. Clarification will
be needed as to how the individual fine in Article 55(b) of the LDC, on the one hand, and the
jointly liable corporate fine in Article 58 of the LDC, on the other hand, may interact in the
practice of enforcement, as this point is relevant, among other things, for the purposes of
leniency and deterrent effects. A clarification as to the full range of persons encompassed in
the term "physical person" as stated in Article 55 of the LDC will also be helpful.

D.

Scope of the Immunity and Penalty Reductions

The first confessor-who is the first applicant that satisfied the qualification criteria
in Article 60(a) of the LDC, will receive immunity from sanctions.7 9 Under this immunity,
the first confessor (a legal entity [e.g., the company] or a physical person [e.g., a company's
director]) will be automatically and fully exempted from the statutory civil fine that otherwise
0
would have been imposed by the Tribunal pursuant to Article 55(b) of the LDC.s
The first confessor will also automatically gain immunity from any imprisonment,
and gain immunity to any criminal sanctions arising under Articles 300 and 309 of the
Argentine Penal Code." At the discretion of the Tribunal, this first confessor may also be
82
However, this latter
fully exempt from paying for any damages arising from civil lawsuits.
supplier, or (2) the
or
customer
indirect
or
direct
is
a
victim
(1)
the
if
not
follow
benefit will
to pay the full
unable
are
cartel
confessor's
the
of
members
the
and
person
victim is another
than the first
other
participants,
if
cartel
scenario,
latter
this
In
83
damages.
extent of
caused by
harm
the
redress
to
fully
impossibility
of
situation
in
a
themselves
find
confessor,
of
liability
joint
the
from
to
escape
allowed
be
not
will
confessor
first
the
activity,
cartel
the
84
damages.
civil
of
payment
to
the
relation
in
participants
cartel
Article 60(b) of the LDC grants penalty reductions to qualified runner-up applicants.
will have the discretion to grant between 20 and 50% reduction in the statutory
Tribunal
The
85
otherwise would have applied absent leniency. The ALP permits the benefit
that
fine
civil
.of immunity from any imprisonment and other criminal sanctions arising under Articles 300
86
and 309 of the Argentine Penal Code. This immunity appears to be granted to the runner-up
applicants in the same terms as they are granted to the first confessor." This means that as

7 Compare Law Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 58., with Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.)
art. 55(b).
' Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a) (the LDC uses the word "exemption" in place of
"immunity").
80 Id.

8' Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 61.
82 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 65.
83 Id.

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art.. 65.
" Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(b).
86 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 61.
87 Id.
84
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far as criminal sanctions are concerned, the LDC has made no clear distinction between first
and runner-up confessors, the exemptions applying to all of them the same way. 8
Article 65 of the LDC allows the Tribunal to authorise discretional reductions in the
amount of damages resulting from civil antitrust lawsuits to runner-up applicants." This
benefit will be subject to the same restrictions as those imposed on immunity recipients who
are customers, suppliers, or who share joint liability because they are cartel members.9 0
If an applicant in the course of leniency proceedings acknowledges that it has
committed a second antitrust violation, this applicant may be granted immunity from
sanctions in relation to this second antitrust violation. 9 1 This immunity for the second
violation is still contingent on satisfying all the qualification requirements from point 1 to
point 7 listed above under subsection 60(a) of the LDC. In addition, if the applicant did not
qualify for immunity for its first violation, the applicant will be entitled to receive an extra
benefit which consists of a one-third reduction of the fine that would have corresponded to the
first self-reported antitrust violation.9 2
The rules governing the ALP are unclear in a few instances.
For example,
immunity for the first confessor does not cover all the possible sanctions that could be
imposed by the Tribunal. Moreover, it is apparent that the Tribunal has powers to impose
disqualification orders, but the extent to which such orders may be included in the immunity
package, or penalty reductions, is not evident either.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE LENIENCY PROGRAM'S KEY FEATURES
A.

Application for Leniency by Physical Persons

The ALP entitles not only legal entities, but also physical persons to apply for
leniency on their own behalf. This feature of the ALP is not found in the EU leniency
program, which does not include the case of applications made by physical persons. As Wils
explains, "As the European Commission has currently no powers to impose penalties on
individuals other than undertakings, the grant of immunity to an undertaking does not concern
its directors or employees and there exists no other immunity policy for individuals."9 3
Unlike the EU leniency policy, the US DOJ created in 1994 an Individual Leniency
Program, which has been administered in concert with the US CLP. This Individual Lenience
Program entitles individuals working for a company to come forward on their own behalf and
become first confessors. 9 4 However, if those individuals would rather join in the company's
confession, the US CLP has been designed to allow such possibility. The US CLP confers a
more lenient treatment not only to the company applicant, but also to all its officers, directors,
and employees who come forward in the company's confession. They must admit their

88Id.
8

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 65.

90

Id.

91

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(c).

92

id.

Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 9.
9 Individual Leniency Policy, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE (Aug. 10, 1994) https://www.justice.gov/atr/individualleniency-policy.
9

172

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol18/iss2/5

10

Mezzanotte: Comments on Argentina's New Leniency Program
COMMENTS ON ARGENTINA'S NEW LENIENCY PROGRAM
involvement in the anticompetitive conduct, and cooperate fully with the DOJ's
investigation. 9 5
The LDC does empower the Tribunal to impose fines and disqualification orders on
96
physical persons. In turn, the ALP allows physical persons to apply for leniency on their
7
own. This is congruent with the direction adopted by the US DOJ. Moreover, the ALP sets
out a mechanism for joint application whereby individuals working for the company may join
in the company's application, again similar to the US leniency policy. Unlike the US CLP,
the joint application contemplated in the ALP has been made available to a narrower set of
individuals. The US CLP confers immunity to any employee of the company who joined the
company's application, whereas the benefits from the ALP's regime of joint application apply
-98
only to those individuals working for the company as representatives.
It has been suggested that the range of persons eligible to profit from the ALP's
system of joint application should be widened to encompass not only the company's
representatives, but also any employee who is willing to confess participation in the cartel and
fully cooperate with the Tribunal's investigation. Commenting on an early draft of the LDC,
the International Bar Association stressed this point as follows:
In the US, UK and other countries, individuals have sufficient incentives to
cooperate because of the threat of being subject to individual fines. The
same incentives exist in Argentina and, thus, extending blanket immunity
to individuals employed by a corporate cartel participant should not have
an adverse effect on the National Competition Authority's ability to obtain
99
cooperation from the relevant officers and employers.
A shortcoming in the ALP may stem from the absence of a more elaborated
definition of the term "physical persons" in the LDC. This term has been stated at the
forefront of article 55 and article 60 of the LDC regarding sanctions and the ALP,
respectively. As defined in such provisions, whether the term 'physical persons' encompasses
solely the group of individuals who are representatives of a company (e.g., directors,
managers, controllers and legal representatives) or, more broadly, refers to any physical
person working for a company has not been obvious.
If all company's employees were included in the term "physical persons," two
would follow. First, any employee of a company, regardless of the role
scenarios
possible
for it, would be entitled to apply for an individual application of
working
they performed
as first confessor or runner-up applicant under Article 60
qualify
to
entitled
and
leniency
any employee could choose to join in the company's
alternative,
the
in
Second,
LDC.
application for leniency after satisfying the criteria set down by the LDC. These options
made available to the employees of a cartel participant would be justified to the extent those

9
9
9
"

Id.
See Part II, II §§ A,C of this article.
Id.
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 61.
99 Antitrust Committee, International Bar Association, Cartels, Mergers and Litigation Working Groups
2016)
14,
(Oct.
9,
at
Bill,
Drafti
Antitrust
Argentine
the
on
Comments
82 87 9 9 6
-3 f f a44.
https://www.ibanet.org/Document/DefaultaspxDocumentsUid=ab4576e8-d750-4ded-ae
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very employees can be subject to individual sanctions due to their participation in cartel
activities.
B.

Adoption of the First Confessor Rule

The ALP offers immunity only to the first applicant that meets the qualification
criteria set out in Article 60(a) of the LDC.'00 Immunity will be granted even if the confessor
applied for leniency after the Tribunal had started an investigation into the applicant's
cartel. 01 Granting immunity even after the Tribunal had begun an investigation is a valuable
feature of the ALP that finds consistency with international practices.
In the past, the US CLP had granted immunity to the first confessor solely on a
discretionary basis and only if the DOJ's investigation had not been started. However, this
state of things changed following the 1993 reform of the US CLP.' 0 2 Since 1993, the US DOJ
has offered to the first confessor two types of leniency benefits: either (1) Type A Leniency,
or (2) Type B Leniency. 103 In Type A Leniency, the first confessor receives immunity
automatically if the confession is made before the DOJ acquired information or collected
evidence from any source (such as from an anonymous complainant, a private civil action or a
press report) about the existence of the cartel, and the applicant meets the qualification
requirements. In Type B Leniency, the DOJ has already received information or collected
evidence about the cartel's operations before the cartel member's confession takes place.
In this scenario, the first confessor may still obtain immunity, but it is not guaranteed as the
DOJ will administer such immunity on a discretional basis.
The changes introduced by the 1993 reform of the US CLP, namely automatic
immunity under Type A Leniency and the possibility of a first confessor obtaining Type B
Leniency, improved the performance of the US leniency program significantly. From 1978 to
1993, the DOJ received, on average, one application for leniency per year. Those
applications neither led the DOJ to detect any international cartels, nor any large domestic
cartels. However, after the 1993 reform, the leniency application rate experienced a twentyfold increase, and those leniency investigations had a meaningful impact.'0 o
Type B Leniency is justified because the probability that a cartel member will apply
for leniency increases significantly after the CA has started an investigation. 0 The
beginning of an investigation increases both the probability that a cartel member will be
caught and convicted, and the expected cost of sustaining the cartel. At this stage, it becomes
more likely that a cartel member will give up its participation in the cartel especially if
immunity is offered.10 7 In terms of cost savings from law enforcement, Type A Leniency will
yield greater savings to the CA than Type B Leniency. The CA prefers to obtain confessions

'
10'

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60.
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a).

"02 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM,
103 Id.

supra note 12.

104 Id.

'05 Hammond, supra note 14.
'06 Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution, 21 INT'L. J. OF INDUS. ORG.
347-379 (2003); Zhijun Chen & Patrick Rey, On the Design of Leniency Programs 56 THE J. OF L. & ECON.
917-957 (Nov. 2013).
107 Id.
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by cartel members as early as possible before it has begun any enforcement efforts on its own
volition. 108 This is perhaps the reason why the Type A Leniency under the US CLP has been
designed to provide a stronger incentive to self-report than the Type B Leniency.
Looking at the first confessor rule in the European Union, the EU Leniency Notice
states that:
The Commission will grant immunity from any fine which would
otherwise have been imposed to an undertaking disclosing its participation
in an alleged cartel affecting the Community if that undertaking is the first
to submit information and evidence which in the Commission's view will
enable it to: (a) carry out a targeted inspection in connection with the
alleged cartel; or (b) find an infringement of Article 81 EC [now Article
101 TFEU] in connection with the alleged cartel.110

"

Here, it does not really matter whether the first confessor submits its application
before, or after, the start of an investigation by the Commission. In either situation immunity
may be granted under the same incentives and qualification criteria.
112
Under the ALP, immunity will be granted automatically to the first confessor.
Unlike the US CLP, which makes a distinction between Type A and Type B leniency, the
ALP makes no such distinction. As it stands today, and compared with the US CLP, the ALP
offers automatic immunity to the first confessor either before, or after the Tribunal has
gathered information or evidence about the confessor's cartel. This ALP regime comes closer
to the system currently in force in the European Union.
It is worth noting that a CA's antitrust investigation may target a cartel that is still
active or a cartel that has already broken up. The EU enforcement experience has shown that
many qualified applicants for leniency came forward well after the cartel dissolved."' It has
been reported that out of 113 cartels detected by the EU Competition Commission between
2001 and 2015, fifty-seven cartels were detected when they were still active, their breakdown
1 14
The other
caused, not by natural reasons, but by the Commission's enforcement actions.
fifty-six cartels, however, had cracked for natural reasons prior to the Commission's
detection. These reasons included the entry of new players to the market, disputes among

100

MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 7.

109 P. Chappaatte & P. Walter, United Kingdom, TIE CARTEL AND LENIENCY REV. 345-46 (2017) (Dissimilar

incentives are also applicable to first confessors in the UK leniency program. Type A Immunity and Type B
immunity for first confessors; Type C penalty reductions for runner-up applicants).
110

Commission Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction offines in cartel cases, OFFICIAL J. OF EUR.

https://eur
2006)
12,
(Aug.
8,
¶
UNION
06 29
: 8:0017:0022:EN:PDF (illustrating that
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer.do?uri=OJ:C:20
the EU had not guaranteed the full amnesty from sanctions to first confessor before the 2002 reform) (straight
brackets added).
". Id. ¶10-13.
112 See §§ II.B., II.D. of this article.
113 Michel Hellwig & Karl Hurschelrath, Cartel Cases and the Cartel Enforcement Process in the European
Union 2001-2015: A Quantitative Assessment, 62 The Antitrust Bulletin 400-38 (2017),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003603X17708357.
114 Id.
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cartel member and disruptions caused by new technologies, among other reasons for the
natural dissolution of cartels."'
C.

Requirements to Qualify as First Confessor

The ALP has less strict criteria for first confessors than the US CLP when
determining if they will be given leniency. For example, to qualify for Type A Leniency
under the US CLP, there are two conditions, among a set of conditions, that must be satisfied
by the applicant: "[w]here possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties" and
"[t]he corporation did not coerce another party to participate in the illegal activity and clearly
was not the leader, or originator of, the activity.""'6 Neither of these two conditions has been
used by the ALP in the LDC.
Under the LDC and ALP, restitution is not a condition for the applicant to qualify as
the first confessor." 7 The first confessor's civil responsibility to the victims of the cartel
conduct would be decided by a civil court, unless the Tribunal had given the first confessor an
exemption from paying civil damages." 8 In contrast, the US CLP does not grant the first
confessor immunity from civil antitrust lawsuits. Even in those instances where the first
confessor is not required to pay restitution, the general rule has been that the first confessor
could still be liable to compensate private plaintiffs in civil court for damage claims.' '1
However, the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004
("ACPERA") has limited the level of responsibility for the first confessor under the US CLP.
ACPERA limited the first confessor's level of civil responsibility by disallowing both joint
liability and treble damages to be entered against the first confessor. In the words of the
ACPERA, the claimant cannot recover damages exceeding, "the portion of the actual
damages sustained by such claimant which is attributable to the commerce done by the
applicant in the goods or services affected by the violation."1 2 0 If the first confessor wants to
avoid both joint liability and treble damages, they must also meet ACPERA's qualification
criteria.
The ALP is also more lenient than the US CLP in its treatment of cartel ringleaders
and of coercion situations exercised by cartel members. The ALP empowers the Tribunal to
grant immunity regardless of whether the first confessor has been the single leader of the
cartel, or has coerced another member to participate in the illegal activity.' 2 ' To an extent, the
APL has mimicked the EU leniency program which does not preclude the cartel ringleader

us Id. See, Andreas Stephan, An EmpiricalAssessment of the European Leniency Notice,
5 J. OF COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 537-61, 544-45 (2009). A high percentage of the leniency applications under the EU Leniency
Notice submitted during the period 1996-2007 also involved a cartel that had ceased to exist; the author
describes EU leniency cases and examines the reasons why an applicant would denounce a cartel that had
already ceased to exist.
116 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM,
supra note 12, § A.
117 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.)
art. 60(a).
"s Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 65.
119 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM, supra note 12.
120 See Frequently Asked Questions About the Antitrust Division's Leniency Program
and Model Leniency

Letters, DEPT. OF JUSTICE 18, pg. 18 www.justice.gov/opa/blog-entry/file/933351/download (last visited May
16, 2019) (describing ACPERA s213(a)).
121 Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(a).
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from applying either.122 But the UE leniency program does reject applicants that have acted
coercively within the cartel, "[a]n undertaking which took steps to coerce other undertakings
to join the cartel or to remain in it is not eligible for immunity from fines. It may still qualify
Again, Article 60(a) 'of the LDC does not enumerate an
for a reduction of fines... .123
eligibility condition requiring the absence of coercion.
D.

Leniency for Runner-Up Applicants

Leniency programs that offered highly attractive reductions in sanctions have shown
higher cartel detection rates. However, strong sanction reductions also create problems of
cartel deterrence. This is undesirable because leniency programs that yield limited deterrent
1 24
The danger
effects are less effective in reducing the rate of cartel formation or persistence.
expense of
at
the
detection
cartel
increase
may
designed,
is that leniency benefits, if not well
should
leniency
much
of
how
question
that
the
rationale
this
cartel deterrence.125 It is within
other
on
the
applicants,
runner-up
the
and
to
hand,
be granted to the first confessor, on the one
for
been
has
problem
this
with
of
dealing
way
A
proposed
controversial.
hand, has proved
attractive
less
and
confessor
first
the
to
only
incentives
strong
leniency programs to provide
126
deals to runner-up applicants.
Nevertheless, international practices on runner-up applicants have differed. The EU
Leniency program allows for a penalty reduction in relation to "those undertakings that
provide the Commission with evidence that adds significant value to that already in the
27
The first company in providing this evidence will benefit from
Commission's possession."l
30 to 50%. The second company will benefit from a reduction
of
range
a fine reduction in the
reduction for later recipients will be no more than 20%. 128
fine
of 20 to 30%, whereas the
and Hilschelrath reports that fine reductions to runner-up
of
Hellwig
Empirically, the work
to
2015, on average, amounted to 29%; from 2011 to 2015,
2001
from
EU
applicants in the
129 In Broos et al., the average fine reduction equaled to
32%.
was
reduction
fine
average
the

122 G Spagnolo & C Marvao, Cartel andLeniency: Taking Stock of What We Learnt, § IV.C (WORKING PAPER
Jan. 16, 2017), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfTm?abstractid=2850498 (illustrating that experimental
studies suggest that this policy of inclusion of ringleaders is preferred from the perspective of cartel deterrence,
although available evidence is not yet conclusive).

123 Commission Notice on Immunity, supra note 110.
124 Joseph E. Harrington Jr & Myong-Hun Chang, When Can We Expect a CorporateLeniency Programs to

Result in Fewer Cartels? (May 2015) 58 J. OF LAW & EcON. 417-449 (May 2015).
125 Id.
126

id.
127 Commission Notice on Immunity, supra note
128 Id. 126.

I10.

129 Michel Hellwig, supra note 113.
In the UK, runner-up applicants can receive a reduction of up to 50
percent of the total financial penalty that would have been imposed under the UK Competition Act. Moreover,
it is within the CA's discretion to grant immunity in relation to criminal sanctions or director's disqualification
orders in favor of runner-up applicants, P. Chappaatte, Cartels and Leniency Review- United Kingdom Chapter,
SLAUGHTER & MAY 345-46 (Jan. 2017) http://www.slaughterandmay.com/what-we-do/publications-andseminars/publications/client-publications-and-articles/t/the-cartels-and-leniency-review-united-kingdom-

chapter//.
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nearly 38% between May 2004 and May 2014.130 In some cases, even when no applicant had
qualified for immunity, cartel members were nonetheless able to qualify for a reduction in

fines.

131

Unlike the EU leniency policy, the scope of the US CLP is narrower so that no
applicants other than the first confessor will be accepted.13 2 Those companies or individuals,
other than the first confessor, that engage in cartel activities may nonetheless still benefit from
a penalty reduction in plea or cooperation agreements negotiated within the frame provided
by the US Sentencing Guidelines. As Wils explains, "[t]he U.S. Department of Justice's
practice is to agree cooperation discounts with an average in the order of 30 to 35 [percent]
for companies that are the second to cooperate ... [a] third cooperating company receives a
significantly lower discount, the fourth even less, and so on."' 33
The treatment of runner-up applicants in the ALP resembles more closely the EU
model, rather than the US model. The ALP states that those applicants that do not qualify for
immunity under Article 60(a) of the LDC may still receive a reduction in sanctions provided
that they present additional evidence not yet in the Tribunal's possession, fully cooperate with
the Tribunal's investigation, and meet the qualification criteria.1 3 4 As presented in the LDC,
the ALP offers runner-up applicants a fine reduction of 20 to 50%. 135
In order to do so, the Tribunal must first set the amount of the fine applicable to the
violator, pre-leniency. In setting the amount of the pre-leniency fine, the Tribunal may
consider factors that mitigate the fine, for example the violators cooperation with the antitrust
investigation. 136 After completing the calculation of this fine, the Tribunal will decide
whether the applicant qualifies for leniency. If so, the magnitude of the fine reduction will be
determined by taking into account, among other factors, the chronological order of the
applications.1 3 7 With the purpose of determining the order of the submitted applications, the
Tribunal will set up a marker system. 138
It is noted that cooperation with the Tribunal may potentially benefit the violator
twice. First, as a factor that mitigates the pre-leniency fine level, and, second, as a necessary
requirement to obtain a fine reduction by way of leniency. On top of the statutory civil fine
reduction, the ALP offers a runner-up applicant immunity on criminal sanctions (arts. 300 and
309 of the Argentine Penal Code) and partial immunity from civil antitrust lawsuits. A

130

See S Broos et al., Analyse Statistique des affairs d'ententes dans l'EU (2004-2014), 67 REVUE
79, 85 (2016) (Fr.).

tCONOMIQUE
131

Use of Leniency in the EU Cartel Enforcement, supra note 11 (describing Case AT.39780 Envelopes, where

there was no immunity recipient yet four out of the five undertakings fined by the Commission received
reductions of between 10 and 50 percent on account of leniency). See also Case At.39780-Envelopes,
EUROPEAN

COMMISSION

(Oct.

http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decdocs/39780/39780

12,

2014)

3528 6.pdf.

132 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAM,
supra note 12.
133

Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 9.

134

Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(b).

Id.
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 56.
Antitrust Law (Law No. 27442) (Arg.) art. 60(b)2.
138 LDCR, supra note 37, at art 60(11).
See also Commission Notice on Immunity, supra note 110,
(providing an overview of the Marker System in the EU leniency policy).
135
11
137
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plaintiffs' inability, due to confidentiality, to access data from leniency applications provides
an additional protective measure to runner-up applicants from civil damage lawsuits. "9
From the vantage point of deterrence, it can be argued that this benefit package
offered to runner-up applicants is too generous. As mentioned earlier in this section, granting
a substantially lenient treatment to runner-up applicants may reduce expected fines deeply
enough to curtail deterrent effects severely. 140 As suggested by economic research, the first
confessor should be granted full immunity and runner-up applicants should either get no
reduction in sanctions, or reductions should be small enough to protect the leniency program
from abuse by cartel members. 1 41 Even keeping leniency application data confidential by
restricting its use in court for the benefit of runner-up applicants has been singled out as a
policy making the leniency program less effective from a deterrence standpoint.142
The possibility that overly generous leniency programs end up fuelling more
43
collusive than deterrent effects has been voiced in the literature.1 In terms of Wils, "[a]t the
stage of the formation and maintenance of cartels, cartel participants will try to adapt their
organization to the leniency policies, so as to minimize the destabilizing effect, or even (if the
1 44
leniency policies are badly designed) to exploit the leniency polices to their advantage."
More generally, the work of Spagnolo and Marviio has examined the relationship between
cartel detection and deterrence. The authors stressed that an exceedingly benevolent treatment
of runner-up applicants may engender an undesirable discrepancy between the goals of CAs
and those of society:
Using the amount of cases, of successful convictions, or of fines collected
as a measure of output or performance creates a natural incentive to win
many easy cases, possibly abusing leniency policy (and plea bargaining)
by being too generous, so as to win more cases more easily. An overly
generous leniency policy offering fine reductions to several reporting firms
may make a competition authority appear very successful in terms of the
number of cases won, of firms convicted, or amount of fines collected,
while reducing social welfare by decreasing cartel deterrence (because
firms expect a lenient treatment if caught) and increasing the amount of
prosecution costs (because there are more prosecuted cartels).145

See § II.D. of this article.
'4 Harrington, supra note 124.
141 H Houba, E Motchenkova and Q Wen, The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing, 15 B.E. J. OF
THEORETICAL EcoN. 2, 351-389 (Apr. 17, 2015). "We provide policy recommendations on how to improve
the design of antitrust policy and leniency, how to eliminate adverse EFFects, and what is necessary to prevent
cartel formation in the first place ... Both current ex-ante and ex-post leniency programs in most EC countries
could be improved by abolishing the reduced fine for the second-reporting firm, similar to the current US
system. On the other hand, single (or the first-) reporting firm should be granted full immunity."; Zhijun Chen,
supra note 106.
142 P Buccirossi, supra note 19 (evaluating critically, among other things, the approach adopted by the EU
Directive 2014/104/EU on rules governing actions for damages).
143 Zhijun Chen, supra note 106 (reviewing the literature on potential abuse of leniency policy); Spagnolo,
supra note 122.
'44 Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 9.
145 Spagnolo, supranote 122.
139
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This suggests that a high rate of cartel detection resulting from leniency need not lead one to
conclude that the program has been working effectively. From the perspective of social
welfare, leniency programs should aspire to achieve cartel detection yet in ways that avert
concerns of limited deterrent effects. The next section of this article will analyze to what
extent deterrence can be measured in real world, and identify a number of policy tools that,
working side by side with the ALP, can help alleviate concerns of limited deterrence.
IV.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS: MITIGATING
CONCERNS OF LIMITED CARTEL DETERRENCE

Benefits derived from leniency programs include higher rates of cartel detection and
conviction, higher fine amounts, less labor spent on discovering evidence of misconduct, and
faster resolution of cases compared with non-leniency cases. 146 Although these observable
benefits suggest that lenience programs are effective tools to combat cartels, questions as to
the effectiveness of such programs have remained. More particularly, the ability of leniency
programs to deter has been contested. A crucial problem has been that deterrence levels are
difficult to measure because the actual size of the cartel population in society cannot be
observed. 141
Since cartels are illegal, and thus keep their activities secret, cartel conduct is
unobservable and difficult to detect by the CA. Therefore, measuring the extent to which the
cartel population in society has been enlarged, maintained or curtailed, following the
introduction or modification of a leniency program, has been elusive. 148 While the
importance of cartel deterrence is evident, the problem of unobservable cartel population casts
doubt on how deterrent effects should be accounted for when evaluating the effectiveness of
leniency programs. A higher occurrence of cartel detection-which can be observed and
initially deemed to be a positive outcome-may be explained by the leniency program's
effectiveness, or by a growing (yet unobserved) number of cartels in society. 149
Some studies have attempted to measure the cartel population despite it being
generally unobservable. For example, Klein measured the impact of the EU leniency program
by looking at the competition intensity of an industry, in which it was concluded that leniency
programs are effective tools for cartel detection and destabilization. 150 Other empirical
studies have looked at short and long-term changes of observable cartel characteristics, such
as, the number of cartel members, cartel duration, and scope of the cartel in the country after
the introduction or reform of a leniency program. Unfortunately, these studies have been
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tainted by selection bias as they relied only on data collected from cartels that were caught by
the CAs.' 5 1 After reviewing existing empirical research, Spagnolo and Marvio found out
inconclusive findings on the extent to which leniency programs have proved effective and
welfare enhancing:
Our conclusion from reviewing the empirical work is that much more
empirical work is required. Judging from the very limited empirical
evidence available, it is still not well established whether leniency policies,
as currently implemented in different countries, are doing any more than
facilitating competition authorities' work. That is, it is unclear whether
they are actually increasing welfare by generating a strong deterrence
effect, or whether they are actually reducing welfare through the larger
administration and prosecution costs they generate, without any
The most favorable evidence
compensating increase in deterrence.
are much tougher, and
sanctions
where
States,
United
available is for the
52
predict.'
would
theory
what
with
this is consistent
Despite the problem of measuring deterrent effects, a substantial body of theoretical
and experimental research has helped identify conditions where leniency programs are more
likely to have a greater chance of detecting cartel activity and, concomitantly, avoid limited
cartel deterrence.
There is a consensus that high sanctions are a crucial element of cartel deterrence for
the effectiveness of leniency programs. This means leniency programs should operate in a
context where the sanctions imposed on those who infringe antitrust law, except for the first
confessor in leniency cases, are substantial. 153 The potential crowding-out effects arising
from mounting numbers of leniency investigations are another relevant factor. Non-leniency
investigations should be preserved by the CA as part of its enforcement and budgetary policy.
One of the reasons for this is that members of the most successful cartels are unlikely
154
Another reason is that in the absence of non-leniency
candidates for leniency applications.
investigations, the credibility of the CA's enforcement capacity will be construed as weak by
5
cartel participants who become less fearful of being apprehended and convicted. 1
Crowding-out effects in actual cartel enforcement have become a reality. In the
European Union, for instance, the percentage of decisions by the EU Competition
Commission based on non-leniency investigations has substantially decreased over time.
From 1996 to 2000, non-leniency cases constituted 90% of the total number of cartel
decisions that resulted with fines. This percentage has progressively fallen to roughly 9%
from 2011 to 2015.156 Spagnolo and Marvdo noted the "particularly generous use of the
leniency tool" by EU enforcers and reckoned that leniency was used in 52% of all EU fines
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imposed on cartels from 1998 to 2014; this is, on average, four leniency recipients per
convicted cartel. 5 7
Wils has argued that ex-officio (non-leniency) investigations are fundamental where
a CA wants to preserve its credibility in the sense of being capable, on its own initiative, to
detect and punish cartel activity. Without such credibility, the author claims, the fear of
detection and conviction of cartel conduct vanishes, rendering the success of a leniency
program unwarranted.' 5 8 Wils recommends that the European Commission maintain focus on
ex-officio investigations, "[i]t is thus important that the European Commission keeps
signaling that it welcomes information from informants, including of course anonymous
informants, and follows up leads provided by informants so as to continue detecting cartels
without leniency, and thus ensure the continued success of its leniency programme."" 9
There are also a number of structural features in competition laws that may help
alleviate concerns of limited deterrence.
Competition laws show adequate deterrent
properties where they create a CA independent from the government. 16 If a government
exerts influence on the functioning of the CA, the CA's decisions will more likely put aside
objective parameters of market rivalry or efficiency and be guided instead by short-term
political gains as reflected in the government's interests and priorities.' 6 ' Similarly, a CA that
is influenced by business lobbies will more likely make decisions that are in line with their
business.' 62 A rule of law that stands for the CA's independence will have the desirable effect
of setting the CA free from political and/or business interference, enabling it to plan its own
enforcement priorities based on relevant parameters of market conditions and efficiency.
The deterrent properties of competition laws are also enhanced when the law bars
hard-core cartels on a per se basis, equip the enforcer with strong investigatory-powers, like
the ability to conduct down raids and issue interim measures, and grant a private right of
action for civil damages.' 63 High level of sanctions that may be imposed on corporations as
well as natural persons are also factors enhancing deterrence, especially on hard-core
cartels. 6 4
It is a promising sign that most of the features identified in this section as alleviating
concerns of limited deterrence have been incorporated into the LDC, which has, in terms of
institutional quality, achieved a strong leap forward. In terms of sanctions, the LDC has
increased significantly the fine levels for antitrust violations compared to prior levels.' 65 The
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LDC has also been designed to strengthen the independence of the NCA. One of the most
cited and emphasized innovations in the LDC is perhaps the NCA's increased
independence.166
As examined in Section II of this article, the LDC has identified in Article 2
conducts which are "absolutely restrictive of competition," whose anticompetitive effects are
presumed by law. Enforcers have also been given strong investigatory powers, including the
ability to conduct down raids and issue interim measures. Under the prior competition law,
the CA had already been granted strong investigatory powers, which the LDC has at the very
least preserved. Both stand-alone and follow-up basis for private enforcement of antitrust
violations are regulated under the LDC, so that victims of those violations may exercise their
right to be compensated for their losses.
One is inclined to argue that all these features included in the LDC, which will work
hand-in-hand with the ALP, may well generate a framework that promotes cartel deterrence.
Still, the actual implementation of the ALP and the competition law enforcement will have to
be watched closely as the new legal framework for competition law in Argentina is
implemented. Among other aspects, it is difficult to think of the Tribunal conducting only
leniency investigations during the first years of the ALP implementation. On the contrary,
one would expect to see the Tribunal, in addition to conducting leniency investigations, also
prosecuting cartels ex-officio.
V.

CONCLUSION

The success of a cartel enforcement policy in Argentina will be measured not only
in terms of how many cartels are being detected and fines imposed, but also in terms of cartel
deterrence: making sure that cartels form less rapidly or have shorter lives. This is a
challenge that the LDC has attacked head-on, not only by creating the ALP, but also by
augmenting the deterrent properties of the competition regime which the ALP will use to
operate. This entails a promising step towards the distant goal of defeating cartels.
Within this framework, it is expected that the ALP will play a critical role in cartel
enforcement policy. To this end, an adequate design of the ALP will greatly advance this
The contribution of this article has been precisely to disentangle the diverse
goal.
components of the ALP in order to critically analyze the ALP's vital characteristics and
potential to function effectively. Relying on comparative leniency policy, the analysis
produced in this article indicates that the ALP has largely adhered to international practices,
although there is room for improvement.
Prior experience from other jurisdictions that implemented a leniency program
suggests that the ALP will increase cartel detection and conviction rates in Argentina. The
current design of the ALP has so intended by granting aggressive benefits in terms of
immunity and sanction reduction. The applicant that qualifies as first confessor is rewarded
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with immunity from civil fines, imprisonment and other criminal sanctions and, possibly,
from civil damages and disqualification orders. Immunity will be given whether or not the
application for leniency has been submitted before or after the Tribunal has collected
evidence on the applicant's cartel. It also makes no difference if the first confessor played the
role of ringleader or coerced other cartel participants to act unlawfully.
The economic research generally agrees that the first confessor should be given full
immunity. However, this research also explains that cartel deterrence can be reduced if
leniency programs overprotect runner-up applicants.
This article has argued that this
overprotective feature is present in the ALP insofar as the reductions in penalties given to
second, third, and so on, qualified applicants are too benevolent. For these reasons, this article
has recommended that the Tribunal, in exercising its discretional powers, adopt a restrictive
stance when granting benefits for runner-up applicants by minimizing penalty reductions.
In consistency with this point of view, this article has also considered an additional
set of policy prescriptions aimed at preventing ineffective leniency programs. In particular,
these programs should operate in a context where sanctions against violators of competition
law are tough and non-leniency cartel investigations are conducted by the CA. In this respect,
the Tribunal has been given extensive powers under the LDC to impose a variety of sanctions
and, therefore, the Tribunal should exercise those powers with decisive force. It has also been
recommended that the Tribunal conduct non-leniency cartel investigations.
These
investigations are necessary because lenience programs, even if successful, are unlikely to
uncover the most profitable cartels. Moreover, those investigations enable the CA to instill in
market players the essential fear of being caught and severely punished should they engage in
cartel conduct.
As a final consideration, clarification is needed in relation to the scope of the term
"physical persons" as it pertains to the LDC, and more specifically, in the ALP. Whether this
term includes any of the cartel participant's employees is still unclear. Clarification is also
necessary as to whether physical persons are entitled to submit leniency applications on their
own behalf (using an individual application for leniency) or, in the alternative, by joining in
the company's application (using a joint application for leniency). The power of CAs to
impose sanctions on natural persons, a power also granted by the LDC to the Tribunal, has
long been viewed as a critical tool for cartel deterrence. This is an important reason to justify
further clarification and discussion on the liability of physical persons under the LDC.
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